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Globalization, State Transformation, and Public Security

SVEN BISLEV

ABSTRACT. Globalization changes the context, the structure, and the institutions of the nation-state. Even the traditional core area of public security is being affected, and rationalities from business and the market are being introduced to the security field. The most recent security technologies build less on public authority and more on management and markets. The San Diego region of Southern California, a region thoroughly affected by globalization, illustrates this process through its introduction of management methods in police work and the growth of gated communities as a defensive technology.

Keywords: • Gated communities • Globalization • Police • Risk • Security • State transformation

Globalization is changing the roles and the workings of nation-states. The declaration of the demise of the state has already been seen a number of times – in the 1960s, with the death of ideologies (Bell, 2000) or of the class struggle (Goldthorpe et al., 1969); in the 1970s, with the substitution of market mechanisms for politics (Becker, 1976); in the 1980s, when the welfare state was declared terminally ill (OECD, 1981) and economic regulation redundant (Ohmae, 1987); and in the 1990s, when history came to an end (Fukuyama, 1992). Those pronouncements were premature, and the state was brought back several times (Evans et al., 1985; World Bank, 1997). It does remain true, however, that at the same time as the nation-state was experiencing unprecedented growth and was firmly establishing its legitimacy, profound transformations were already under way.

To some extent such transformations are the result of the very growth of the state apparatus – huge service-producing institutions call for different governance mechanisms than classical organizations of authority. But it is also true that globalization has disseminated, accelerated, and deepened the changes: more

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intensive social and cultural contact between societies, fiercer economic competition, new communication media, and social structures that span national borders are all forces that have moved societies and cultures in new directions.

As globalization proceeds, state roles and structures experience significant transformations. Weberian bureaucracy is becoming New Public Management (NPM), while the Keynesian model that previously informed state–economy relations is losing its hegemony to neoliberal and monetarist thinking. But the changes do not stop there. To make the scene even more complex, functions traditionally allocated to the state (those of economic and social governance) are largely moving from centralized government to a governance network.

The present article looks at some of these state transformations. It questions the way private-sector rationalities intrude upon the institutional model of a modern state, and the way a core state monopoly is now being shared with private interests and organizations. For illustrative purposes, it looks at transformations in public security taking place in Southern California: the managerialization of police work and the growth of private security technologies (gated communities).

The first three sections below discuss "security" as a general policy issue. Section I relates the classical Weberian definition of the state to the issue of security. Section II suggests that globalization entails a looser connection between the nation-state and security. Section III takes the argument down to the institutional level, detailing the introduction of NPM in policing. Section IV adds empirical illustrations from the San Diego region in Southern California. Again using illustrations from San Diego, the next section presents an additional case of the privatization of security: gated communities. In the Conclusion, generalizations from the regional case are attempted and some questions about the implications for the state are raised.

(I) The State and Security

In the tradition of "security" as a policy area, securing a particular *regime*, guaranteeing its sovereignty over a particular territory, plays a dominant role. The first general model of a nation-state, the "Westphalian" state (Caporaso, 1989), institutionalizes this notion by establishing the precedent of mutual recognition between states as a foundation for a concept of territorially delimited sovereignty. Traditional writings on sovereignty and security have focused on the physical protection of the sovereign state, but in the Westphalian model, external and internal security (the protection of the state's sovereignty and the protection of the social order) actually go hand in hand.

Sovereignty is defended by the use of security resources – military might and political power. The first question, however, is how these security resources are produced in the first place, and the answer points to the importance of the social system. Security capabilities are products of society; the supply of armaments and political resources depends upon the economic and social forces at work in society. Without a working social system, or social order, security could not be maintained, so on top of the defense of sovereignty, the social order must also be secured.

Weber's classical definition of the state as holding a monopoly on the exercise of legitimate violence rests upon this conception of the state, including the notion that social order is crucial to the state (Gerth and Mills, 1946: 78). To Weber's institutional definition, Tilly (1992) adds a sociohistorical dimension emphasizing

the two foundations of the modern state: resources and (physical) power. His analysis thus reiterates the centrality of defense of the social order (Skocpol, 1985; Tilly, 1992).

But the perception of security as a defense of sovereignty (and, by implication, the social order) is insufficient. The sovereign state is not there only to ensure the physical safety of citizens, it also exists for broader purposes. In the Weberian concept of legitimacy, there is a distinct political dimension. Weber develops arguments that are present in classical liberal writings – in Hobbes, Locke, and Smith, for example. For them, the state has not only a realistic "function," a necessary place in society, but also a telos, an ethical or normative purpose – to perform tasks that are necessary for citizens, to solve problems, and deliver services. The state is not only an institution for maintaining order, but is also a creature made or accepted by citizens because they need it for a purpose: to build a civil society.

From this perspective, security receives a new meaning: society is an association of citizens, and the maintenance of security is a necessary function for that association, something without which it cannot exist and thrive. Security is not only the physical protection of a regime and its associated social order, but also a political function benefiting civil society. Without the state to ensure basic security, there would be no civilization, no civil society.

Seen in this way, security involves both a sociocultural and sociopolitical aspect. To be able to live in a civilized society, citizens must be provided with security. The institution framing this sort of rationality is the state, and the decision mechanisms of the state constitute the political system. In modernity, the state is also a cultural creature, through its association with the nation. The state contains and protects the nation, a community of culture and identity. This twinning of state and nation around notions of identity and security has survived a couple of centuries of nationalist wars, imperialist ambitions, and international integration projects.

In this sense, security has found and retained its anchoring point: the nation (whether referred to as the motherland, fatherland, *Heimat*, or birthplace) is what we protect, what we fight for – or fight against, as the case may be. The nation is a foundational part of modern identity, and potentially a violent notion.

(II) Globalization and Security

Even after the terrible wars fought in the nation's name and the terror exercised under its banner, the nation remains a very strong identifier. Despite attempts to deconstruct the nation through social inquiry (Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 1983) and postmodern literature, surveys still continue to reveal national identity as a very strong and stable factor (Ingelhart, 1997). Moreover, nation-states remain politically strong. Some of the most violent current or recent dictatorial and totalitarian states (Iraq and North Korea) have effectively used the rhetoric of nationalism to mobilize the masses in the service of regimes that mostly benefit small power cliques. Again in a negative sense, although more civilized, nation-states are using their clout to block international processes that go against what they define as their national interests – in the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and within the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for example.

On the other hand, it is frequently claimed that "globalization" undermines the privileged position of the nation-state (Leander, 2002). Globalization is said to

entail the development of supranational and transnational forces outside the control of national governments and the emergence of phenomena that cross the traditional structures of national interests. Nonetheless, globalization has not produced actors with the same kind of effectiveness and decisiveness as the stronger states (Held et al., 1999).

Globalization is a controversial notion in economics, political science, and cultural studies. The idealist implications of the notion of a unified globe are contradicted by the fact that very few trends and phenomena are literally global – most are regional or express some form of western or American hegemony, or both. Visions of the world as a single marketplace in which transnational corporations dominate are denied by the continued importance of national institutions in the regulation of trade and production (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). In addition, the challenges to nation-states by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations have not changed the status of nation-states as by far the strongest actors on the "global" scene.

"Nation-state," however, is not a homogeneous concept. Such states are not equally strong in any sense, and the challenges they encounter in terms of power affect some of them more than others. They have also been challenged in different ways. Nations have been challenged both as institutional frameworks (nation-state governments) and as cultural factors: identities (nationalities) and ideologies (nationalisms). The *institutional* challenge derives from businesses wanting to regulate themselves, NGOs unwilling to leave politics to politicians, and parties wanting to lower taxes and diminish regulation. The *cultural* challenge has to do with the surge of supranational and subnational ideologies and identities. Against the theoretical predictions of a general secularization, religion has taken on new forms and new importance, creating new political divisions and alliances. New theocracies have been established, defying the general consensus about nations being the basis for modern states.

Both forms of questioning of the nation-state model (the extreme inequality between contemporary nations and the challenges to the state's monopoly of power and legitimacy) have potentially deep implications for security (Leander, 2002). The balance of power and wealth that formed part of the modern world and the way it was known and understood is being challenged. Globalization shifts resources across the globe and opens venues for the transmission of conflict. Globalization idealists argue that the increasing openness will turn out to be a positive factor for wealth, because it mobilizes the comparative advantages of nations and enables the harvesting of transnational economies of scale. It can also create political advantages, because of a transparency that exhibits the benefits of democracy and exposes dictatorships to critical scrutiny. In the short term, however, it is certainly an engine of immediate risk creation – shaking the foundations of established institutions and undermining the existence of traditional economies.

Besides the redistribution of economic and political resources, globalization also entails a dissemination of postmodernity: the tendency of countries to transcend the divisions and institutions of industrial society and the emergence of new structures and mentalities reflecting a postindustrial society. The security implications of this so-called postmodern shift have been stressed in Beck's influential formulation of the idea of a "risk society." The insecurities of postmodern society and their associated security technologies, he argues, constitute a new structuring principle in western society (Beck, 1992). Apart from structures,

processes (that is, practices and discourses) also change. In numerous areas of social life, risk and security discourses come to dominate the public space. The new "governmentality" (that is, the rationality of governance [Foucault, 1991]) expressed in these discourses represents a shift from welfare-state to risk-society governance. The "security" discourse has specific political effects: "securitization" refers to the exceptions to otherwise general norms for ethics and politics that apply whenever something is claimed to be about security (Waever, 1997).

If, for analytical purposes, one accepts a distinction between an international and an intra-national dimension of security, the present discussion focuses on the latter – on security management and governance at the levels of police work and private self-protection. However, in order to grasp the changes taking place at the intra-national level, one must observe them as reflected in the wider mirror of international developments. Globalization not only affects international relations and transnational processes, but the very substance of "domestic" social structures and cultural changes as well. The technological and institutional innovations transforming societies and cultures are spreading globally through epistemic communities, knowledge networks, and discourse networks (Hansen et al., 2002; Salskov-Iversen et al., 2000). Changes in security technologies at the state and local level are shaped or mediated by global developments taking place in the discourses and practices of management and security. While local security involves different kinds of private self-protection, at the international level the privatization of security goes all the way to the hiring of private armies (Avant, 2001; Shearer, 1998). The next two sections look into the changes in security technologies observable in the San Diego region, focusing on two areas that are particularly salient: first, the change in police work from fighting crime to managing security and, second, an emerging security lifestyle, that is, the growth of gated communities.

(III) Managerializing Police Work

Historically, police forces were not everywhere as essential a component of the nation-state as they are now. In Continental Europe, especially in Germany, "state" and "police" were almost synonymous concepts, while in Anglo-Saxon cultures, the maintenance of urban law and order was a task for local watchmen, private agencies, and constabularies – more like armies than police forces. Beginning in London in the late 19th century, public forces with a general mandate were gradually created, and in the 20th century, the models of state and police gradually converged. Police became synonymous with an institution overseeing the implementation of law and order. With this general legal mandate, the police came to embody the nation-state as a legal creature: the juridical anatomy of the institutionalized state.

After the Second World War, all the democratic nation-states expanded widely, both in terms of their institutional size and regarding their societal functions. The new models of state-building became different versions of a welfare state entrusted with securing the well-being of all the nation's citizens. The forces of law and order, once more or less embodying the state, were outnumbered and overwhelmed by quite different armies – the social and cultural workers now employed by the state. Welfare-state rationalities came to influence notions of security and ideas of policing. Police forces were now taking part in the general preventative approach to social problems. They were expected to work together

with social agencies in creating the conditions for positive social behavior and in preventing deviance and dysfunctional attitudes. Romantic notions of "good cops," assumed to exist in an earlier golden age of social order and consensus, were employed to create images of community-oriented police work.

Globalization and postmodernity have brought new notions about the role of the state, and the welfare state is no longer the indisputable core model of the state. Along with ideas about limiting the size of the state and letting the market take care of more societal functions, new notions also emerged about how the state should conduct its business – notions of "New Public Management" (NPM) and "Good Governance." As the state changes from a welfare state to a postmodern state, the dominant model of the state shifts from welfare provider to service producer. Welfare states are governed according to political goals and seek political approval and legitimacy. The post-welfare or postmodern state aims at satisfying customers.

In this post-welfare state, the discourses and practices of policing are changing. Police organizations are being managerialized, and the structure of safety organizations liberalized. "Welfare state policing," with its ideas of community cooperation and an integrated approach to crime and social problems, is being influenced in two ways: by a "punitive turn," meaning higher incarceration rates and longer punishment, and by management ideas, implying the quantification of results, internal monitoring, surveillance in public places, and do-it-yourself policing (Baker, 2000; Erickson and Haggerty, 1997; Erickson et al., 2000; Hope, 2000; Hope and Sparks, 2000a; Loader, 1999; O'Malley, 2000; Stenson, 2000; Zedner, 2000).

The managerialization of police work is part of the broader movement of NPM.[1] The definition of NPM employed here[2] stresses three features or goals of modern public management: a responsive public sector, an efficient organization, and a flexible, liberal organizational structure. The police reforms relate to all of them.

A *responsive* public sector is one in which "customers" (citizens in the old parlance) are heard and taken seriously. In policing, a dialog with the public about identifying risks and prioritizing risk-management efforts becomes necessary. This can be done in different ways – one way is by attending to the always-present, unspecified, and not always rational "fear of crime," a pliable factor in the political game (Glassner, 1999). Another way circumvents the political process and relates police work directly to citizens: techniques such as "neighborhood" or "community" policing were invented in the 1960s as a form of consensual or dialogical policing in which communication channels are kept open both ways and security thinking is disseminated to citizens. Some analyses point to a development from that cooperation and mutuality to dissemination techniques (O'Malley and Palmer, 1996; Saunders, 1999; Stenson, 1993).

The second important group of NPM concepts concern *efficiency*. The Weberian notion of "effectiveness" demands that goals be reached accurately. The modern idea of "efficiency" seeks to reach the organization's goals expending as few resources as possible. When management ideas come into the picture, the goal is one of weighing comparative costs and benefits: a balance is sought between the importance of the goals sought and the amount of resources spent. Goals, as well as resources, must be carefully specified, monitored, and accounted for. Security, the goal of police forces, is not an absolute value or an end in itself, but a direction to go in; how far one goes depends on the character and amount of the benefits produced and how much one has to spend to get there. This "managerialized"

perspective on security is sometimes called the "new penology": a perspective on crime as something to be monitored, managed, and limited with means that are carefully adjusted to the prospective gains (Hope and Sparks, 2000a; Zedner, 2000).

The third overriding value of NPM can perhaps be referred to as *flexibility*: the emphasis on various forms of reorganization, on flexible and autonomous organizational structures, on indirect modes of government, and on decentralization and governance through networks. Some functions are privatized, while others are given more autonomy in some aspects of their operation. At its most ambitious, government works with and through private organizations and individual citizens – governance through technologies of the self (Dean, 1999; Foucault, 1991). In this area, new practices and discourses of security are established – self-management in the security area. Through community-oriented policing or neighborhood policing, private citizens, businesses, and associations are drawn into the governance system. These more dialogical self-governance systems are supplemented with direct technologies for the control and regulation of security: video surveillance of both public and private spaces and the private acquisition of safety devices such as alarm systems, personal defense gadgets, and so on (Coleman and Sim, 2000; Ericson, 1994; Sasson, 2000).

(IV) Security Management in San Diego

The San Diego region is a highly "securitized" place.[3] Owing to the long-time presence of a large naval base, army and navy personnel have been part of life there since the city grew out of its agricultural past. The national border (separating San Diego County, at the southern tip of California, from Tijuana in Baja California Norte, Mexico) entails the presence of several specialized enforcement corps. The tension at the border is intensified by the huge socio-economic gap between the two countries, and a partial militarization of the whole border area has been the result. In the region at large, several big military facilities (training grounds for different groups of the armed forces) dot the landscape. Regular public order officials (state police, county police, and city police) have the task of enforcing law and order in a place not known for its strict rule obedience. On top of these public safety institutions, private security has been growing rapidly in Southern California (Sklansky, 1999).

The San Diego–Tijuana border area itself is mostly a poor and dirty place; the cities south of San Diego tend to be rather poor, in comparison with California, and the Tijuana area is filled with problems associated with Mexican poverty and a tradition of low-end tourist businesses. The whole region, however, is in the process of rapid economic and social development, with all the complex problems that that entails. The typical border problems are enlarged by the presence of extreme social and cultural differences and urban growth. The most rapid growth is taking place south of the border, in the fragile institutional landscape of Baja California, while San Diego is developing at an average US pace. There is some cooperation between the two sides, but the structures and cultures of the two societies, even two so intensely connected, are still very different. To avoid the conflicts entailed in the differential dynamics, San Diego City and County are paying as little attention to their neighbor as they can, although this is also something that comes out of necessity, as local governments have little power and few resources in the USA, and the poverty and corruption of northern Mexico do

not look attractive to a city already deep in debt and looking hard for financing for its most pressing needs.

San Diego is also a very "globalized" place. Immigrants from all over the world come together in a city built in just one century and modern (globalized) technology together with a massive tourism industry form the foundations of its economy. The armed forces establishments represent the classical external security element, but international security is also increasingly about regional integration, here in the form of US–Mexican relations that are inexorably growing in importance and visibility. And not least, security is presently about the protection of a social, economic, and environmental order that is being rocked by globalization.

Globalization has meant an increasing flow across the border, accelerating the problems of security that affect all sectors and groups in the region. The 1970s and 1980s were decades of steeply increasing crime figures for the whole region. In the past decade, crime rates have declined. Standards of living have been improving and unemployment dropped steadily throughout the 1990s. Strong law-enforcement efforts, involving both the military and police, supplement the social forces reducing crime (Andreas, 2000). The problem of crime is still top of the list of priorities for regional government (San Diego Dialogue, 2000b). This may be for ideological reasons, in the sense that a lot of other and more topical issues, such as economic development, social inequality, and welfare problems, are not legitimate targets for US local government.

The general problems of governance in the San Diego-Tijuana region are rooted in these economic, sociocultural, and political pressures, but also in the complex institutional structures of governance: five "vertical" layers (from municipalities to NAFTA) are involved in governmental issues. In addition, "horizontally," a long list of functional and political jurisdictions, frequently cutting across the vertical layers, share authority and competence: port authorities, water districts, school districts, transport authorities, and so on. As mentioned already, local governments tend to be poor because their tax base is fragile and limited by rules such as the famous tax-revolt milestone of "Proposition 13," which capped tax levels by mandating referenda for tax increases.

Throughout the US public sector, reforms and experiments have been conducted in the past two decades in an attempt to slim down the state and optimize the public use of financial resources. At the federal level, a beginning was made by President Carter's productivity committee and continued by the "Reinventing Government" movement (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993) as well as by the Clinton administration's office for public reform.[4] Meanwhile, numerous city governments conducted their own campaigns, some while participating in national and international benchmarking exercises. Phoenix, Arizona, was nominated as the "best run city in the world" by the Bertelsmann Foundation's Better Governance Network. San Diego City and County (and several other, smaller cities in the region) took part in these efforts, introducing efficiency reforms in various segments and functions of local government. As reforms went on and new management techniques were introduced, security services (public safety and police) were among the fields to be affected by managerialization.

In line with the conservative and liberalistic model of Southern Californian politics, the region is among the front-runners in privatizing security. Some of this is in the form of self-protection (detailed in the next section) and some in the form of private policing, for example, the emergence of numerous private security

companies hired to protect public functions, service and commercial establishments, and private residences. Besides the private security guards, now outnumbering the police force, security hardware businesses thrive and the privatization of security functions such as prisons, information systems, and other security technologies is proceeding (Shearing and Stenning, 1987; Sklansky, 1999). State policies on crime are punitively oriented: the prison population is growing sharply and a "three-strikes" law (mandating life imprisonment for every third-time offender, no matter what crimes the three convictions are for) is in effect. California was the second state to introduce this kind of law, and there is little talk of getting rid of it again, despite its problematic results and overflowing prisons.[5] This ideological punitiveness goes against the grain of the "new penology," in the sense that putting small-time thieves in prison is probably very inefficient in terms of reducing crime at the lowest possible cost. Despite widespread privatization, prisons are expensive institutions to operate.

In other aspects, the new penology has won through in a sense of there being a thorough managerialization of public safety. Police departments must, like other public authorities, operate along managerial lines in creating work incentives, formulating performance goals, and publishing results. They publish their mission statements, their goals, and programs on the Internet. The San Diego County homepage even exhibited (in 2001) the performance contracts of top managers, including the director of public safety. The authorities publish detailed crime statistics, as well as budgets detailing the resources allocated for reaching the declared purposes. And both San Diego County and City police forces operate with dialogical notions of police work. In San Diego County, the Public Safety Group speaks of community-oriented policing, while the San Diego City Police employ the term "Neighborhood Policing." Under these headings, both police forces keep up a dialog with citizen groups, businesses, and other public agencies in order to enhance self-protection and diminish the risk of crime.

(v) Private Security: Gated Communities

Taking care of one's own security has always been among American ideals. The Second Amendment, guaranteeing "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms," has often been interpreted as the promise of a right to individual violent protection, and the notion of a rough society of armed individuals is part of US folklore. The contemporary idea of protecting private residences through technological devices, formerly a possibility only for the very rich, is defended as a modern, middle-class emanation of that urge to self-defense.

Just as California led the nation in punitive policing, it has been leading this other postmodern trend: the privatization of "middle-class" security. The sales of security devices and security services have risen sharply in recent decades, and a physical expression of what Reich (2001) called the "secession of the rich" is rampant in Southern California: the establishment of gated communities.

Throughout San Diego City and County gated communities are spreading rapidly ("stucco algae" is one sarcastic designation of both their growth and their preferred color schemes and styles), most of them designed by developers and built for the middle and upper classes. A few exceptions aside,[6] the overwhelming majority are for people with the money to buy a house at prices ranging from US$150,000 (small houses for pensioners) to almost US$1 million.

The exact quantity and proportion of gated residences is unknown, and

estimates vary widely, from a few percent of existing homes (suggested in an interview with the director of county public safety in 2002) to at least 30–40 percent of new residences in this fast-growing region. In the new suburban housing developments, fences and gates are a selling point, being markers of status and exclusivity. All new apartment buildings in the densely populated downtown areas are secured with gates and new apartment blocks in suburban areas are likewise secured, but the level and form of protection varies widely (interview with a San Diego police consultant).

Gated communities (GCs) are ostentatiously provided with security measures – the fences and gates that represent closeness, exclusivity, and security. This does not necessarily mean that crime rates are much lower than in the surrounding areas, although statistics are hard to get. Some effects in relocating crime to unprotected developments must be expected, as may a shift in the types of crime: most gates protect against the stealing of cars, and therefore also against the stealing of large objects that can only be transported by cars. On the other hand, some have worried that inhabitants feel too safe and secure to protect themselves properly once they are "inside." A San Diego police representative who had made a small comparative case study reported that his figures showed a certain overall reduction of crime in GCs as compared to residences without gates, but the study was not large enough to be representative and no other reliable figures seem to exist.

Do the gated communities provide security against crimes committed by neighbors, against the things that people in the same block occasionally do to each other? One might surmise that the "community" character of living under like conditions and being members of the same association would create a cooperative spirit that would act to lower the level of customary conflict. In the literature about gated communities, significantly in Blakely and Snyder's (1997) ethnographic descriptions of a large number of developments, it is pointed out that while inhabitants do feel closer to each other than to people "outside," the "community" designation does not necessarily reflect strong social integration or a close-knit community feeling in GCs. Quite frequently, the often very detailed lifestyle regulations of homeowner associations engender conflict and suspicion among neighbors (McKenzie, 1994).

The gated communities may provide another form of security – not physical or legal, but financial. Developers and real-estate agents promote GCs as a means to protect property values, shielding owners from market risks through the stability and orderliness guaranteed in the association rules. The little evidence that there seems to be (Blakely and Snyder, 1997: 16–17) does not support this claim, but the assumption lives on. It is still widely presented as a selling point for new developments, because the gates allow sales materials to convey a picture of a protected, village-like atmosphere. Gated communities are planned so as to provide developers with a standard vocabulary for marketing their goods and to engender a predictable, well-tried interaction with customers. This standardization is part of an attempt at making the market predictable.

In such a conservative view of social life and economic risk, life must be made predictable for security's sake. The gates and the homeowner association rules are there to render life in the developments predictable: the gates make the area into a reservation for the specific people in it. The rules stipulate numerous things that are not allowed – things that will disturb the perfect regularity of the outward appearance of the properties or may inspire irresponsible behavior among

residents. Frequently applied rules are injunctions against advertisements on the grounds (no political posters or no commercial signs), against parking vehicles outside garages, and against putting up any extra structures or altering the exterior of houses in any way (Blakely and Snyder, 1997).

The marketing language of real-estate people leads subtly into another aspect of gated exclusivity: segregation. In advertisements, there are numerous references to certain lifestyles that connote high status and to the absence of unpleasantly different neighbors.[7] Physical security is stressed less than social and economic predictability. Furthermore, these "middle-class" neighborhoods tend to be racially exclusive. Very few people of African descent can be found living inside the gates (Blakely and Snyder, 1997: 152–3). A subtle language of social and racial exclusivity is employed to classify those who are not welcome (Low, 2001; Sigelmann and Henig, 2001). In advertisements, gates are mentioned alongside other features of (collective) separateness and (communal) exclusivity. Sellers are careful not to promise directly that significantly fewer crimes will be committed. In interviews with residents (Blakely and Snyder, 1997), it becomes clear that they do not naively trust that their fences and gates will physically keep the evil out. Fences are there to define a space in which life is lived in a certain way, allowing inhabitants to overlook and neglect unpredictability, immorality, and insecurity.

The reduction of social conflict (as a source of risk and insecurity) inside a gated community, however, sharpens and potentially aggravates existing social conflict by emphasizing differences and excluding "outsiders" whose interests differ from those of the insiders. When the City of San Diego had to start developing policies toward gated communities, the most controversial issue seems to have been the segregationist and socially exclusive aspect of such communities. Critics called them "snooty," "snobby," "isolationist," and "elitist" in the city council debates in the late 1980s. Several attempts were made to restrict their growth by liberal-minded groups and politicians disliking the segregationist implications as well as by professional planners disliking the closing off of planning possibilities. In the end, however, strong pressures from developers have tended to prevail. A 1995 policy initiative resulted in a weak set of regulations, and a renewed offensive in March 2002 was rejected. Developers are still able to exert a constant pressure on the city to allow more luxury developments, taking up the space where affordable housing could be built and pushing the city to build infrastructure in the areas with wealthy families.

San Diego City and its region are in a permanent housing crisis for lack of affordable housing, and social differences have been growing in recent years. For California as a whole, the incomes of less affluent households (up to and including average households) have been steadily falling, in inflation-adjusted terms, from 1970 to the mid-1990s, while upper incomes have been just as steadily rising (Reed, 1999). The rest of the USA experienced the same difference, but social differences in California grew more than in the USA as a whole. For the San Diego area, a study from the Center on Policy Initiatives (2002) reported that the *median* income for one family is just under US$40,000, while a *minimum* household budget for a family of four amounts to about US$42,000 – indicating that all families below the median income will find it very difficult to make ends meet. Almost 20 percent of San Diegans live below the federal poverty line. In addition, only about 25 percent of San Diego County families earn a household income that would allow them to purchase a median-priced home (San Diego Dialogue, 2000a).

(VI) Conclusion: Security Governance and State Transformation

Even in the area of public security, a core function of a sovereign state, the state is no longer alone and unchallenged. The examples from Southern California point to a growing interference of private actors and private-sector rationalities in this area. As indicated, the idea is not to argue that the nation-state is becoming weak or superfluous, only that it is becoming different: new rationalities enter the mechanisms of government and governance, and new discourses appear in the public political sphere.

Assessing the depth and intensity of the change, it is necessary to keep in mind intercultural differences. US governance has never been the same as the European versions – or Asian or African, for that matter. Right from the beginning, "private government" has had a place in the US legal system, inherited from the British legal tradition. The state is a less special, less elevated institution than in Continental Europe, and privatization as well as the introduction of private-sector rationalities seems a less dramatic development. Still, there are parallels, and current state transformations are far from unproblematic.

In Anglo-Saxon legal culture, collective legal subjects, both private and public, originate from the same legal foundations (they are "corporations") and although they have different legal status and powers, the fundamental construction of an organization as a legal subject is common to both.[8] The "private governments" of gated communities do, however, constitute a specific legal and political problem for US government and the courts (McKenzie, 1994): their homeowner associations, with their frequently strict rules for the use and maintenance of houses and grounds, compete with public government in a complex and unresolved fashion. Private security forces are also creating ambiguities for government – the private armies in the service of governments as well as the specialized police units and armed guards working in privately administered environments. In the USA, universities, business establishments, entertainment complexes, and shopping malls can have their own armed guards or even police forces. In these cases, national security forces are sharing their monopoly on the legitimate use of force with others. The results are overlapping jurisdictions and contested competencies, creating fluid situations as to the responsibility for security and complex definitions of whose security it is that is being protected.

These developments are not new in the USA, but their growth is still sufficient to provoke analytical and political interest (Sklansky, 1999). Neither are they uniquely American: managerial policing has been extensively analyzed and practiced elsewhere (Erickson, 1994; Erickson and Haggerty, 1997; Erickson et al., 2000; Hope and Sparks, 2000b; Shearing and Stenning, 1987; Stenson, 1993) and gated communities can be found in a large number of third-world countries, where pockets of wealthy citizens are fencing themselves off from the general squalor (Caldeira, 2000; Glasz, 2001). In Europe, however, they are rare.

Despite different points of departure and uneven speed, the main trend toward introducing commercial and business rationalities in the public sector seems to be universal (Christensen and Laegreid, 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). The analysis of this article demonstrates that transformations in the technologies and rationalities of governance extend even within the core area of public security and that the role of the state is being transformed. Questions need to be asked about the effects of these transformations. Do the new modes of governance fit with inherited notions of democracy? Are managerial techniques adequate to the

public sector's task of serving many masters, as well as performing societal functions that serve no particular master? Also, in terms of the social functions of the state, whose security is being protected by the new governmental technologies? Who is being left behind, and what are the consequences?

Notes

1. New Public Management is, of course, a broad church, and the vast literature about it varies from compilations of country studies (Lane, 1997; Massey, 1997) through regionally focused studies (Klausen and Ståhlberg, 1998; Riegler and Naschold, 1997) to sectoral studies (Ferlie et al., 1996). Recent volumes by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) and Christensen and Laegreid (2001) cover the issues in more breadth and depth than most others, building on the theoretical groundwork laid by Hood (1990, 1991) and Pollitt (1993).
2. This definition is developed in more detail elsewhere (Salskov-Iversen et al., 2000).
3. The San Diego case study builds on two short visits and three months' fieldwork there, the latter financed by the Fulbright Committee and organized with the help of the University of California at San Diego, Urban Studies and Planning Program.
4. The G.W. Bush government has discontinued efficiency efforts, preferring to cut back the public sector directly through huge tax cuts.
5. Recently (2001–2), the Californian courts have overturned some of the worst effects of the law.
6. The two exceptions that prove the rule are an existing, socially mixed neighborhood that has been retrofitted with gates as a protective measure and a section of a low-income area (Logan Heights) which has been renovated and provided with gates to mark and protect the improved territory – much in the sense of creating a "defensible space" (Newman, 1972).
7. The advertisements studied were in the real-estate section of the *San Diego Union-Tribune*, the major newspaper for the whole region, over four Sundays in March–April 2002.
8. The difference between private and public is mostly that business corporations have more autonomy and more legal protection from the state (Frug, 1999).

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